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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal calls upon us to decide whether the 
beneficiary of an employee plan may bring an action under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1001 et seq. ("ERISA") against the plan to recover interest 
on benefits the plan paid after some delay, but without the 
beneficiary's having sued under ERISA for the benefits. 
Relying on both ERISA and state-law theories, Abraham 
Fotta brought such an action against the Trustees of the 
United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement 
Fund of 1974 ("the Trustees"). The district court dismissed 
the ERISA count for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted and dismissed the pendent state 
claims without prejudice. Fotta appeals the dismissal of the 
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ERISA count and the Trustees cross-appeal to have the 
state claims dismissed with prejudice. 
 
I. 
 
Fotta's complaint alleges the following: While employed as 
a miner, Fotta was covered by a United Mine Workers- 
administered pension plan that provided, among other 
things, disability insurance. Fotta suffered a work-related 
injury on July 24, 1984, rendering him totally and 
permanently disabled. A considerable time after the injury, 
and only after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the 
causal relationship between Fotta's work and his disability 
under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 
Fotta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 626 A.2d 
1144, 1147 (Pa. 1993), the Trustees granted Fotta disability 
benefits, with an effective date of September 1, 1993. The 
Trustees, however, later revised this effective date and 
granted Fotta disability benefits effective August 1, 1984. 
Accordingly, Fotta received a lump-sum back payment of 
$21,600 reflecting disability benefits from August 1, 1984, 
to September 1, 1993. Fotta then demanded interest on 
this back payment, which the Trustees refused. 
 
Fotta sued the Trustees in the district court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania. The three-count 
complaint seeks recovery under ERISA and, alternatively, 
under state-law theories of breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment. The Trustees moved to dismiss, arguing that 
the first count failed to state a claim under ERISA and that 
the remaining state-law counts were preempted by S 514(a) 
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1144(a). The district court dismissed 
the ERISA count for failure to state a claim and then 
dismissed the remaining state-law counts without prejudice 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1367, stating that there was no longer 
federal jurisdiction over the case. We exercise plenary 
review over the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss. 
Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
II. 
 
This appeal raises an issue of first impression for this 
court: whether a beneficiary who has been able to receive 
his or her benefits due under an ERISA plan only after 
 
                                3 
  
considerable delay, but without resorting to litigation to 
recover that payment, has a cause of action under ERISA. 
None of the other circuits has yet addressed the issue 
either. The district courts that have addressed the question 
are divided: two have held such claims for interest non- 
cognizable under ERISA, see Devito v. Pension Plan of Local 
819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 
Scott v. Central States Pension Plan, 727 F. Supp. 1095 
(E.D. Mich. 1989), and one has ruled that ERISA does 
provide a cause of action for interest, see Hizer v. General 
Motors Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1453 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
 
Fotta invokes two of ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions, 
sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3)(B), codified at 29 U.S.C. 
SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(a)(3)(B) respectively. The first of 
these provisions, section 502(a)(1)(B), is the means by 
which an ERISA plan beneficiary is authorized to sue to 
recover benefits under the plan. This subsection states in 
relevant part: "A civil action may be brought . .. by a 
participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan [or] to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan . . . ." The second of these provisions, 
ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B), permits a plan beneficiary "to 
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress 
[violations of ERISA or of the terms of an ERISA plan] or (ii) 
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of 
the plan." 
 
The Trustees emphasize, and Fotta acknowledges, that 
Congress has not explicitly provided a cause of action for 
interest on delayed benefits payments. The parties further 
agree that no provision in the plan itself specifically 
establishes Fotta's entitlement to interest. The Trustees 
contend that because neither the statute nor the plan 
expressly provides for the relief that Fotta seeks, Fotta's 
claim must fail. 
 
A. 
 
We disagree with the Trustees' contention that the lack of 
an express provision for interest in ERISA is necessarily 
fatal to Fotta's claim. In enacting ERISA, Congress intended 
for the judiciary to develop a body of federal law"to deal 
with issues involving rights and obligations under private 
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welfare and pension plans." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)). This is, of course, not a 
boundless grant of authority; the development of federal 
common law under ERISA is appropriate only when 
"necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the 
statutory pattern enacted in the large by Congress." 
Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we 
must first determine whether recognition of a cause of 
action for interest under one of ERISA's enforcement 
provisions is a proper exercise of the court's power to 
develop the law of remedies under ERISA. 
 
It is of considerable moment that we have previously 
recognized that a beneficiary may seek prejudgment 
interest in a suit to recover benefits due, notwithstanding 
the lack of an express directive from Congress to that effect. 
In Schake v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. Severance Plan 
for Salaried Employees, 960 F.2d 1187, 1192 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1992), we acknowledged, albeit in passing, that 
prejudgment interest was available in actions to recover 
benefits under ERISA (although we ultimately found that 
the claimant's failure to timely request such interest 
deprived the court of jurisdiction to award interest). We 
reiterated and amplified this ruling in Anthuis v. Colt 
Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1010 (3d Cir. 
1992). What is even more significant, we did so while 
acknowledging that ERISA does specifically provide for 
prejudgment interest in another class of actions--lawsuits 
to recover delinquent employer contributions under 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(g)(2)(B). Id. at 1009. "In recognizing the 
availability of a discretionary award of prejudgment interest 
in Schake and Anthuis, we embraced the Eighth Circuit's 
reasoning in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 
783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986), and Short v. Central States 
Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1984). In the latter 
case, the court set forth the rationale for the recognition of 
prejudgment interest: "To allow the Fund to retain the 
interest it earned on funds wrongfully withheld would be to 
approve of unjust enrichment. Further, the relief granted 
would fall short of making [the claimant] whole because he 
has been denied the use of money which was his." Short, 
 
                                5 
  
729 F.2d at 576. Adopting these precepts, we held in 
Schake, and reiterated in Anthuis, that "prejudgment 
interest typically is granted to make a plaintiff whole 
because the defendant may wrongfully benefit from use of 
plaintiff's money." Schake, 960 F.2d at 1192 n.4; Anthuis, 
971 F.2d at 1009. 
 
The Trustees do not take issue with the holdings in these 
cases. On the contrary, they approve the cases where the 
courts have awarded prejudgment interest when tied to an 
underlying judgment on the merits, notwithstanding the 
lack of explicit statutory authority for such interest. 
Instead, the Trustees seek to distinguish the award of 
prejudgment interest in the circumstance where benefits 
have been recovered from that where the beneficiary brings 
an independent action solely to recover the interest, 
arguing that the claim for benefits is expressly provided in 
section 502(a)(1)(B). This was essentially the position of the 
district courts in Devito and Scott. 
 
We believe the distinction is unpersuasive. The principles 
justifying prejudgment interest also justify an award of 
interest where benefits are delayed but paid without the 
beneficiary's having obtained a judgment. The concerns 
animating our decisions in Schake and Anthuis--viz., 
making the claimant whole and preventing unjust 
enrichment--are not diminished merely because the plan 
has paid the overdue benefits without the claimant having 
resorted to litigation to secure payment. A late payment of 
benefits effectively deprives the beneficiary of the time value 
of his or her money whether or not the beneficiary secured 
the overdue benefits through a judgment as the result of 
ERISA litigation. 
 
Unjust enrichment principles also apply with equal force 
in this setting. To hold that the absence of a judgment 
deprives the injured beneficiary of the time value of his or 
her money would create a financial incentive for plans to 
delay payment and thus retain interest that rightfully 
belongs to the beneficiary. Accord Hizer, 888 F. Supp. at 
1461. 
 
B. 
 
We are also unpersuaded by the Trustees' argument that 
Fotta's claim for interest is not cognizable because it is one 
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that seeks "extracontractual damages" within the 
contemplation of the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 
144 (1985). Indeed, Russell was the principal basis for the 
district court's denial of interest in this case. To be sure, 
the Russell Court rejected a beneficiary's effort to invoke 
ERISA's fiduciary obligations as a means of recovering 
damages arising from delayed benefits. In so doing, 
however, the Russell Court held no more than that the civil- 
enforcement provision relating to breaches of fiduciary duty 
does not provide the claimant with a cause of action for 
consequential and punitive damages. The court expressly 
reserved the issue whether any of ERISA's other civil- 
enforcement provisions might authorize the kind of relief 
sought in Russell: "Because respondent relies entirely on 
S 409(a), and expressly disclaims reliance onS 502(a)(3) 
[permitting an action for "other appropriate equitable 
relief "], we have no occasion to consider whether any other 
provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of extracontractual 
damages." 473 U.S. at 139 n.5. 
 
Moreover, we do not find that an interest claim is 
"extracontractual" within the intendment of the Russell 
opinion. Unlike the plaintiff in Russell, Fotta is not seeking 
consequential or punitive damages. Fotta's complaint, 
accepted as true for present purposes, seeks interest as a 
compensatory remedy--that is, to compensate him fully for 
the Trustees' several-year-long delay in discharging their 
contractual responsibility to Fotta. Interest for late payment 
has long been regarded as an implicit part of a contractual 
obligation to pay money. This principle was recognized by 
the Supreme Court more than a century ago: "Every one 
who contracts to pay money on a certain day knows that, 
if he fails to fulfill his contract, he must pay the established 
rate of interest as damages for his nonperformance. Hence 
it may correctly be said that such is the implied contract of 
the parties." Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375, 396 (1896) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). And more recently, the 
Court noted that "prejudgment interest traditionally has 
been considered part of the compensation due plaintiff." 
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989). 
 
Consequently, we find that a cause of action for interest 
on delayed benefits payments is not foreclosed by either the 
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terms of ERISA or the terms of the plan. We further 
conclude that section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA--allowing a 
beneficiary to sue for "other appropriate equitable relief . . . 
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of 
the plan"--is the appropriate vehicle for such a cause of 
action. This conclusion is consistent with our holding in 
Anthuis that the awarding of prejudgment interest under 
ERISA is within the district court's discretion, "given in 
response to considerations of fairness and denied when its 
exaction would be inequitable." 971 F.2d at 1009 (alteration 
and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, prejudgment interest 
is generally recognized as an equitable remedy in other 
legal contexts. See Liberty Lincoln-Mercury v. Ford Motor 
Co., 134 F.3d 557, 574 (3d Cir. 1998) (Prejudgment interest 
is an equitable remedy under New Jersey law.); Hughes v. 
Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 616 (3d Cir. 
1991) ("When deciding whether to award prejudgment 
interest to a party, a court must consider `whether 
countervailing equitable considerations militate against 
such a surcharge.' "). 
 
Hence, Fotta's claim for interest is appropriately raised 
under Section 502(a)(3)(B), the civil-enforcement provision 
relating to equitable relief.1 In this regard, the Trustees' 
argument that an interest award cannot be equitable 
because it is an award of money (as opposed to an 
injunction) misses the mark. As noted above, the awarding 
of interest where benefits have been unjustifiably delayed 
not only ensures full compensation, but also serves to 
prevent unjust enrichment. Restitution--the traditional 
remedy for unjust enrichment--is widely, if not universally, 
regarded as a tool of equity. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990) 
(Money damages are considered equitable when "they are 
restitutionary."); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 
395, 402 (1946) (differentiating, under the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, between statutory damages at law and 
restitutionary relief falling within the statutory grant of 
equity jurisdiction). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although we do not reject section 502(a)(1)(B) as providing a possible 
statutory bases for such a claim, we need not reach the issue in light of 
our decision. 
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In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that the 
Supreme Court has shown an "unwillingness to infer 
causes of action in the ERISA context, since that statute's 
carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides 
`strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize 
other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate 
expressly.' " Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 
254 (1993) (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-147). But in 
recognizing that an action for interest may be maintained 
as an action for "other appropriate equitable relief "under 
ERISA, we do not run afoul of this caution. To be sure, 
section 502(a)(3)(B) "does not . . . authorize `appropriate 
equitable relief' at large, but only`appropriate equitable 
relief' for the purpose of `redress[ing any] violations or ... 
enforc[ing] any provisions' of ERISA or an ERISA plan." 
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253 (brackets in original). As we noted 
above, payment for the time value of money, when 
appropriate, is an implicit term of the underlying 
contractual obligation. Therefore, an award of interest is an 
equitable remedy enforcing an ERISA plan provision, albeit 
an implied one, within the meaning of section 502(a)(3)(B). 
 
In sum, by permitting this action to go forward, we are 
not "engraft[ing] a remedy on a statute . .. that Congress 
did not intend to provide." Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we effectuate 
ERISA's objectives by recognizing, under principles of 
equity, that beneficiaries should be fully compensated and 
that any unjust enrichment of plans at beneficiaries' 
expense should be avoided. 
 
We reject the Trustees' argument that we are without 
authority to recognize Fotta's claim. To the contrary, ERISA 
requires that we develop the law of ERISA so as to define 
the proper remedial scope of the statute. See Russell, 473 
U.S. 134, 157 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("ERISA was not so 
`carefully integrated' and `crafted' as to preclude further 
judicial delineation of appropriate rights and remedies; far 
from barring such a process, the statute explicitly directs 
that courts shall undertake it."); Teamsters Pension Trust 
Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d 206, 
208 (3d Cir. 1998) ("In a situation where the statute does 
not provide explicit instructions, it is well settled that 
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Congress intended that the federal courts wouldfill in the 
gaps by developing, in light of reason, experience, and 
common sense, a federal common law of rights and 
obligations imposed by the statute."). 
 
We therefore hold that a beneficiary of an ERISA plan 
may bring an action for interest on delayed benefits 
payments under section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA, irrespective 
of whether the beneficiary also seeks to recover unpaid 
benefits. Because the remedy we recognize here is equitable 
in nature, its award involves an exercise of judicial 
discretion. And, like other equitable remedies, it is subject 
to equitable defenses such as laches, an issue the district 
court did not consider as it dismissed the complaint on 
motion. As this case will be remanded for the district court 
to exercise its discretion, we note that this court has held 
in other contexts that there is a presumption in favor of 
awarding interest. See Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 
127 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that award of pre-judgment and 
post-judgment interest is presumptively granted in back- 
pay cases under the FLSA). In Stroh Container Co., the 
Eighth Circuit applied that presumption in an ERISA case, 
stating that interest "should ordinarily be granted unless 
exceptional or unusual circumstances exist making the 
award of interest inequitable." 783 F.2d at 750. That 
statement was quoted approvingly by this court in Anthuis. 
971 F.2d at 1010. We now make explicit that interest is 
presumptively appropriate when ERISA benefits have been 
delayed. 
 
III. 
 
In their cross-appeal, the Trustees urge that the district 
court erred in dismissing Fotta's state-law claims without 
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Trustees contend that the court continued to have federal 
question jurisdiction over those claims by virtue of the 
"complete preemption" doctrine. See Dukes v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining complete preemption). Furthermore, the 
Trustees urge that the state-law counts should be 
dismissed with prejudice because they are preempted by 
section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1144(a). The Trustees' 
arguments may have merit. But because Fotta conceded at 
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oral argument that he will not pursue his state-law claims 
in the event that his first count is found cognizable under 
ERISA, we need not decide these issues. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the district court and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I am in general agreement with the opinion of the court. 
Under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), an 
ERISA beneficiary may bring a civil action "to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress" a violation of the 
plan. If the plaintiff in this case can establish that the 
trustees violated the plan by failing to pay his benefits on 
time, an award of interest would constitute "appropriate 
equitable relief." Such an award is recognized as 
appropriate equitable relief in comparable circumstances 
under the law of trusts. See Restatement (2d) of Trusts 
S 207 at 470 (1959); 3 Austin Wakeman Scott and William 
Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts S 207.1 at 262-63 (4th 
ed. 1987); Nedd v. United Mine Workers of America, 556 
F.2d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 1977); Toombs v. Daniels, 361 
N.W.2d 801, 810 (Sup.Ct.Minn. 1985). Thus, this is not a 
case like Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 
134 (1985), in which we are asked to supplement the 
remedies specified in the statute. 
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